

Essay

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Cold War or New World Order

On the role of Germany and Europe in a multipolar world order II

July 27th, 2021

Redaktion/ Wissenschaftliche Koordination

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Herausgeber (V.i.S.d.P.)

Univ. Prof. Dr. Karl-Rudolf Korte

Redaktionsanschrift

Redaktion Regierungsforschung.de
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Zitationshinweis

Rüttgers, Jürgen (2021): Cold War or New World Order, On the role of Germany and Europe in a multipolar world order II, Essay, Available from: regierungsforschung.de

Cold War or New World Order

On the role of Germany and Europe in a multipolar world order II¹

By Jürgen Rüttgers²

I. Introduction

In 1989/90, when people in the GDR stood up with candles in their hands to demonstrate for the freedom and unity of the German people, they knew and saw that the dictatorships in Europe had lost the battle. The Hungarians ended the Cold War by opening the Iron Curtain.³

When Czechoslovakia opened its borders on November 4th, 1989, 30,000 citizens of the GDR set out for the West. The result was the opening of the Berlin Wall. After a "spectacular resignation first of the GDR cabinet and then of the Politburo" on November 9, the fateful date in German history, the opening was announced by Politburo member Günter Schabowski. It was "the happiest hour in German history."⁴

A year later, after the election of the first freely elected Volkskammer on March 18th, 1990, and the first free local elections on May 6th, 1990, the process of reunification began.

If the people of the GDR had shouted "We are the people" at the 130 or so demonstrations in October 1989, they shouted "We are one people" in January 1990.⁵ The new federal states joined the scope of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany.⁶ The Treaty on Economic, Monetary and Social

¹ Part I revised and supplemented June 26, 2021, regierungsforschung.de March 18, 2015, and Inaugural Speech Bonn University, January 17, 2011.

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³ Rüttgers, Jürgen (2017), 'Geschichte und Zukunft des Vereinten Europas', in: Jürgen Rüttgers, Frank Decker (ed.) (2017), *Europas Ende, Europas Anfang*, Frankfurt a. M., p. 18 ff.

⁴ Judt, Tony (2006), 'Die Geschichte Europas seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg', bpb Bonn, p. 706ff; Wollé, Stefan (2015), 'Die DDR, Eine Geschichte von der Gründung bis zum Untergang', bpb Bonn, p. 443.

⁵ Wollé, Stefan, op. cit. 4, p. 440f.; Judt, Tony, op. cit. 4, p. 707.

⁶ Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on the creation of German unity (Einigungsvertrag) of August 31, 1990, in: *Dokumente der Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands*, ed. by Ingo von Münch, Stuttgart 1991, p. 328.

Union of May 18, 1990⁷ and the 'Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany' (Two Plus Four Agreement)⁸ provided further legal foundations for the reunification of the two German states.

Although it was possible, with the help of the USA and its President George H. W. Bush, to achieve the reunification of Germany with the consent of its neighbors and partners, there were considerable problems with regard to Germany's role in Europe.

For Chancellor Helmut Kohl, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it was clear that the "linking of national and European interests [...] did not serve solely to secure unification." He "also pushed his own ambitious European integration agenda. This passion for Europe went far beyond what the economic situation or political imperatives would have demanded."⁹

For Kohl, as for Konrad Adenauer, Europe was "a question of war and peace." On February 3rd, 1990, he therefore declared in Davos: "Human rights and human dignity, free self-determination, a liberal social order, private initiative, market economy, these are the building blocks for a future European peace order, overcoming the division of Europe and the division of Germany."¹⁰

Although French President Mitterrand ultimately supported the reunification of Germany, he wanted to prevent a dominance of a reunified Germany in a united Europe and a federal Europe. For him, the planned European economic and monetary union was of great importance to integrate the reunified Germany into the European structures. Mitterrand wanted a "closer economic, political and defense community", which he believed "would be to France's advantage". "The future of Europe would thus 'become a function of Franco-German cooperation.'"¹¹

This was an "absolute anathema" to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.¹² Referring to the British experience in World War II, she told a journalist that it was "now in the power of the Germans to expand into an economically dominant empire, and what they could not achieve by world wars they will achieve by economic imperialism."¹³ Therefore, she also rejected European monetary union and political union. Speaking to the press, she declared of the other heads of government, "They have no idea at all what political union means."¹⁴ The consequence of this policy was summed up by the 'New York Times' on December 10th, 1989: "U.S. relations with West Germany are gradually eclipsing those with Britain."¹⁵ It is true that the reaffirmation of common defense within the framework of NATO succeeded in finding a basis for further cooperation.

⁷ Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic establishing a monetary, economic and social union of 18 May 1990, in: *Bulletin No. 63*, 1990, p. 517 – 544.

⁸ Treaty on the Final Settlement in Respect of Germany of September 12, 1990, in: *Dokumente der Wiedervereinigung*, ed. by Ingo von Münch, Stuttgart 1991, p. 372; Spohr, Kristina (2019), 'Wendezeit, Die Neuordnung der Welt nach 1989', Munich, p. 327ff.

⁹ Spohr, Kristina, op. cit. 8, p. 368.

¹⁰ Spohr, Kristina, op. cit. 8, p. 369.

¹¹ Spohr, Kristina, op. cit. 8, p. 367.

¹² Spohr, Kristina, op. cit. 8, p. 370.

¹³ Spohr, Kristina, op. cit. 8, p. 370.

¹⁴ Spohr, Kristina, op. cit. 8, p. 373.

¹⁵ Spohr, Kristina, op. cit. 8, p. 373.

To this day, however, the members of the European Union have failed to understand the historical significance of the 'Great European Freedom Revolution of 1989/90,' which made possible not only the reunification of Germany but also European reunification, and to draw the consequences that followed.

After the Second World War, a new world order emerged, which we call the 'Cold War'. Power was divided between the free nations of the West, which since the 1950s included the Federal Republic of Germany. The second bloc was the community of communist states, which in turn divided into the Warsaw Pact led by the Soviet Union and Communist China. During the post-war period, the colonial era in Africa, Asia and Latin America came to an end. The colonies of Britain, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, and Portugal became independent. However, attempts to create a Third World community failed. The Community of the Free West, led by the United States of America, during this period advocated, as former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote, "a steadily expanding, cooperative order of states that follow common rules and norms, have liberal economies, renounce territorial conquest, respect national sovereignty, and adopt participatory and democratic systems of government."¹⁶ Their goal was to create an international order based on democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and rules-based international cooperation.

By the time the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact were in dissolution in the late 1990s, following an uprising of citizens in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic countries who demanded their human rights and a rule-of-law and democratic system, the West had won the 'Cold War.' The communist states had accepted the rules of the Westphalian system. But this was only possible because the latter drew its universality from a "procedural - and thus value-neutral nature."¹⁷ Its "rules could be adopted by any country: Non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, inviolability of frontiers, sovereignty of states, and promotion of international law. These were the strengths of the Westphalian system. But it also had its weaknesses. Designed by states weakened by the bloodletting of war, there was no direction for further development."¹⁸

The 'Great European Freedom Revolution of 1989/90' thus led to a new democratic beginning on the continents of the world. Neither Russia and its neighboring states allied with it, nor China, which combined its rapid economic upswing with a dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party, nor the Islamic states, which based their policies on the basic rules of Islamic law and partly of an Islamic fundamentalism, were ready to accept Western values and human rights. Moreover, since no multilateral rule-based policy was accepted by President Trump in the USA, and governments such as the Polish government under Kaczyński, Hungary under Orbán or Brazil under Bolsonaro were not ready to live the common Western values, there were major upheavals that could not be dealt with until today.

Therefore, and even more, efforts must be increased to work out a common policy for the future of Europe, so that the 'United Europe' can play an important role for freedom, peace, justice,

¹⁶ Kissinger, Henry (2014), 'Weltordnung', Munich, p. 9.

¹⁷ Kissinger, Henry, op. cit. 16, p. 413.

¹⁸ Kissinger, Henry, op. cit. 16, p. 413.

democracy, and the rule of law in a new world order. Already today, the European Union is "making the world a little cleaner, a little healthier, safer, more sustainable every day [...]", as Ulrich Fichtner writes.¹⁹ Specifically, tech companies are building their devices according to EU regulations. Ghana meets EU standards in cocoa production. In Argentina, Israel, and Russia, the 'right to be forgotten' adopted in Europe applies. Laws written in Europe are adopted almost word for word in many countries around the world. The fast-food chains McDonalds, Subway, Wendy's take chemical additives out of their products. When Microsoft, Google, Apple, or Intel sue each other for competition violations, they also call on "the EU Commission as an arbitrator."²⁰ "Europe's view of data protection [...] has within a short time become the global standard that no company, no country can ignore." Google had to grudgingly spend "hundreds of years of human labor" to implement the Data Protection Regulation.²¹

II. Challenges of the 21st century

We live in a time of change. In the world of the 21st century, we face multiple challenges. Four of them are of central importance:

1. Globalization and the New World Order

In the last 20 years, billions of people have entered the global market economy as customers and as suppliers. The end of the Cold War had opened borders and made freedom of movement possible in many places.

2. Climate Change and Energy Supply

The second central challenge is climate change and securing our supply of raw materials and energy. In view of the immense economic growth of countries such as China, India and Brazil, this issue is taking on existential significance.

3. Demographic Change

The third central challenge is to manage demographic change. The aging society is already having an impact on personal biographies as well as on the economy, social security systems, living conditions and the interaction between the generations.

4. Digital Revolution

The fourth central challenge is the triumph of the Internet and new media. At its core, this is not a technical revolution, but a social and cultural one.

¹⁹ Fichtner, Ulrich (2021), 'Die sanfte Macht', *Der SPIEGEL* No. 4, 23 January, p. 19.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 19.

²¹ Ibid., p. 19.

From 1994 to 2014, around 131,000 robots were installed in Germany. The use of new technology does not necessarily destroy jobs but changes the nature of jobs.²²

III. What is globalization?

So, in the words of Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, "what is this 'globalization' anyway, condemned by some and praised by others?"²³ The number of books, essays and analyses on this topic seems endless. So do the attempts at definition and patterns of evaluation.

Some see globalization as an opportunity for greater prosperity, knowledge, democracy, and human rights throughout the world.

Others see it as a process that widens the gap between rich and poor and destroys the natural foundations of life.

The philosopher and publicist Rüdiger Safranski²⁴ distinguishes between 'globalization' and 'globalism'. For him, modern globalization began with the globalization of fear and terror, with the existence of nuclear weapons, terrorism, and globally organized crime, followed by the ecological and economic aspects of globalization, the – as he writes – "plundering of our planet".

Globalism, on the other hand, is for Safranski an idea or ideology, namely the image of a new world society: the image of the global village. But this - he writes - is in fact a mirage.

The U.S. political scientists Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye describe globalization as a "state of the world characterized by networks of interdependence across intercontinental distances" that can "consist of movements and influences of capital and goods, information and ideas, people and violence, as well as environmentally and biologically active substances."²⁵

Globalization, however, is first and foremost a process of the dissolution of boundaries in human spheres of life across all continental and nation-state borders: worldwide trade, the international production of goods based on the division of labor, the mobility of labor, knowledge, information, the encounter of art and culture from all over the world.²⁶

Many people live in fear and anger because they are afraid of the impositions of these epochal changes. For the first time in human history, the basic conditions of human life are being stripped of their boundaries.

²² Rüttgers, Jürgen (2019), 'Guten Morgen, Europa!', Baden-Baden, p. 41.

²³ Stiglitz, Joseph (2002), 'Die Schatten der Globalisierung', Bonn.

²⁴ Safranski, Rüdiger (2003), 'Wieviel Globalisierung verträgt der Mensch?', Munich/Vienna.

²⁵ Keohane, Robert O. / Nye, Joseph S. (2000), 'Power and Interdependence', 3rd Ed., Boston.

²⁶ Rüttgers, Jürgen (2021), 'Die Entgrenzung der Welt', in: Wildemann, Horst (Ed.), Innovationsbeschleuniger Krise, Krisenmanagement – Hochlaufkurven – Wachstumspfade, Tagungsband Münchner Management Kolloquium 09. und 10.03.2021, TCW Transfer-Centrum für Produktions-Logistik und Technologie-Management GmbH & Co. KG, 1st Ed., Munich, p. 471 – 476.

The space of human existence has not only been delimited by the conquest of outer space. Technical progress has also given us insights into the smallest units of human life and our living world. According to the UN Refugee Agency, the smartphone-driven migration of people currently includes more than 60 million people who have left their homes and crossed borders. In 2015, more than one million people crossed the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe. Up to five million people are waiting for new life chances in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and northern Africa.

Time is also no longer a fixed factor. Every event is broadcasted live and simultaneously around the world. Humanity's knowledge doubles every 4 to 5 years. Big Data will further accelerate this growth. Human communication takes place around the clock. No state can fully control the information that is available on the worldwide web any longer.

Global terror has led to an unboundedness of security.²⁷ Digital surveillance of public space has resulted in a loss of privacy.

Five American companies have a monopoly on the use of most of the data collected and processed in the world. These same companies have most of the capacity of high-performance AI (Artificial Intelligence).

The abolition of banking secrecy, the disruptive economy and brand piracy have greatly changed the rules of the social market economy. It is not the producer but the consumer and his data that are important today. Mass production is being replaced by production dictated individually by the customer. Not the information, but the consent to the information is important in the future. Nothing is secret anymore. More and more, contracts and laws are being questioned politically.

Many people are looking for security and demand new nation-state borders. They want to go back to the good old days. They have forgotten that political responsibility is responsibility for the public, a common good-oriented action and not an instant reaction to a post on social media. They have not learned that representative democracy affects everyone, and thus indirectly the individual, through the regulation of public affairs, that is, through legislation. On the Internet, it is the exchange of individual opinion that takes place, not the public discourse that makes the emergence of public opinion possible in the first place.

The "normative project of the Western world" is characterized by immutable values and rights.²⁸ The inner core of this project includes inalienable human and civil rights, the rule of law, i.e., also the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers and thus the independence of the judiciary. Furthermore, this includes representative democracy and popular sovereignty. "This consensus has broken down - and not just in Poland, but in many countries, including the U.S. and the U.K."²⁹

²⁷ Mascolo, Georg (2016), 'Die Soft-Power-Strategie', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 10 February, p. 12.

²⁸ Winkler, Heinrich August (2015), 'Geschichte des Westens, Die Zeit der Gegenwart', Munich, p. 585.

²⁹ Appelbaum, Anne (2021), "Putin will keine Freunde", Interview in *Der SPIEGEL Nr. 10*, 6 March, p. 80.

American economist Dani Rodrik sees this project in a dilemma. In his view, Western societies are no longer capable of simultaneously advancing democracy, national sovereignty, and economic globalization. Therefore, if Western states want to continue to advance globalization, they will have to decide either to say goodbye to the nation-state, i.e., the connection between nation and state, or to democracy.³⁰

The European answer to this dilemma has so far been the division of sovereignty between the European Union and the member states. Together with the elimination of internal borders in Europe, this has led to a division of sovereignty. There is no other solution, because at the same time the link between nation and state is breaking down, just as since the 16th century we have accepted a separation of state and religion as a necessary condition for peoples to live together peacefully.

In Europe there are many nations, and indeed several nations in one state as one nation in several states. In the future, too, there will be nations as voluntary associations of people in national communities. They will live together with other nations in new state structures. The "general concept of the state as a constitutional, legal and social state is not logically necessarily bound to a national framework."³¹ Thus, they will succeed in living as a civil society in peace and freedom as part of the state structures in a global world. The democratic constitutional state and the free society will then not be opposites. The state's monopoly on the use of force will be distributed among several levels of state action. For Germany, this has created a four-level democracy with the municipal level, the federal level of the states, the federal level, and the European level.³²

To sum up, the state's monopoly on the use of force can retain its peace-making function through such a division of powers, even under the conditions of globalization and digitization.

This European model is facing major challenges in our day. Above all, the immigration of refugees has led to political controversy at both the European and national levels. Former federal constitutional judge Udo di Fabio has pointed out that "there is no free society, no democracy, without a strong constitutional state."³³

But this sentence also applies in reverse: there is no strong constitutional state without a defensible democracy. Anything else would be arbitrary rule.

We are witnessing populists trying to establish authoritative rule in various Western states. In Hungary as well as in Poland, France, Turkey or even in the USA, there were or are attempts to impose a counter-revolution against the achievements of the French and American revolutions. By invoking popular sovereignty and the democratic majority principle, they want to abolish the rule of law and the separation of powers. However, the rule of law also includes the recognition that majorities

³⁰ Rodrik, Dani (2011), 'Das Globalisierungsparadox', Munich, cited in Winkler, Heinrich August (2015), op. cit. 28, p. 608.

³¹ Schwietering, Thomas (2011), 'Was ist Gesellschaft?', bpb Bonn, p. 61.

³² Fukuyama, Francis (1992), 'Das Ende der Geschichte. Wo stehen wir?', Munich; Rüttgers, Jürgen (2016), 'Mehr Demokratie in Europa', Marburg, p. 43ff.

³³ di Fabio, Udo (2015), 'Schwankender Westen', Munich, p. 170ff.

are not allowed to do everything they want. Democracy must meet clear legitimacy requirements. In a democracy, the people are the source of state power.³⁴ State powers can only be exercised "on the basis and within the limits of the constitution".³⁵ The task of the rule of law in a democracy is therefore to ensure the representation of the people. Only in this way can the principles of the rule of law necessary for the order of democracy and the social market economy, namely the principle of legality, the principle of freedom and equality and the principle of legal certainty, be formally and materially guaranteed.³⁶

Understood in this way, globalization is not a genuinely modern phenomenon: mass migration, worldwide epidemics, inventiveness, international trade, and transnational corporations have not only existed since the end of the 20th century. They have always existed: For example, in the migration of people in the 4th to 6th century, the European plague pandemic in the 14th century and the Spanish flu at the beginning of the 20th century, both of which claimed millions of lives, as well as the British East India Company or global companies such as General Motors or Ford in the age of industrialization.

Globalization, however, is not just the global economic and social interconnection of countries and peoples, not just the dissolution of market boundaries.

The essence of globalization is the transition from an industrial to a knowledge society.³⁷ The traditional production factors of land, capital and labor are being joined by a new production factor: knowledge. An ever-greater share of human value creation is generated by knowledge. The modern form of globalization would be inconceivable without the enormous advances in the sciences, especially computer sciences and communications technologies. Henry Kissinger states: "Rapid technological change is transforming our world to an extent that was last influenced by the Enlightenment: with quantum computing and artificial intelligence, our entire concept of reality is at stake. For in the Enlightenment, reason and practical execution were still inseparable."³⁸ That is different today.

Experts estimate that humanity's knowledge doubled between 1800 and 1900. Today, that happens in just four to five years.³⁹ Supposedly, there is a new medical discovery every five minutes today.

³⁴ Möller, Christoph (2008), 'Demokratie', bpb Bonn, p. 48; Grimm, Dieter (2011/1980), 'Reformalisierung des Rechtsstaates als Demokratiepostulat?', in: Transnationalisierung der Volkssouveränität, https://beckasets.blob.core.windows.net/product/readingsample/8412535/9783515098304_excerpt_001.pdf, p. 19ff.

³⁵ Möller, Christoph (2008), *ibid.*, p. 73.

³⁶ Möller, Christoph (2008), *ibid.*, p. 74.

³⁷ Rüttgers, Jürgen (1999), 'Zeitenwende – Wendezeiten, Das Jahr-2000-Projekt: Die Wissensgesellschaft', Berlin, p. 13ff.

³⁸ Kissinger, Henry, cited in Prantner, Christoph (2021), 'Ein neuer Begriff vom Westen', *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 5 June, p. 2.

³⁹ Riesenhuber, Dr. Heinz (2009), Address by the Senior President of the German Bundestag at the Opening of the Constituent Session of the 17th German Bundestag in Berlin on October 27, 2009, Bulletin of the Federal Government No. 107- 1, 27 October, p. 5.; Schneider, Siegfried (2010), Speech by the Head of the Bavarian State Chancellery at the FOS 12 Marktredwitz farewell ceremony in Marktredwitz on July 23, 2010, <http://www.bayern.de/Anlage10318292/VerabschiedungFOS12Marktredwitz.pdf> (Accessed 13 April, 2011).

Every three minutes a new physical correlation is discovered, every minute a new chemical formula.⁴⁰

According to a study by a media company, mankind had produced 161 billion gigabytes of data by 2006. For 2008 alone, the study now found an increase of 487 billion gigabytes. For 2012, it already predicted an additional 2,500 billion gigabytes.⁴¹ In 2018, 33 zettabytes were used worldwide. In 2025, it will be 175 zettabytes.⁴²

Modern globalization is not the cause, but the consequence of the development towards a knowledge society. Not the other way around, as is often claimed. In the meantime, however, a reciprocal process has emerged: globalization is accelerating the development toward a knowledge society. This in turn strengthens the process of globalization.⁴³

In 2004, the U.S. economist and columnist Lester Thurow⁴⁴, for many years a lecturer at Boston's Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), explained the economic value of knowledge: In the past, the richest person in the world always possessed natural resources: Land, gold, or oil. Now, for the first time in human history, it is possible to become fabulously wealthy by controlling knowledge, he said.

IV. A new world order as a result of globalization

The transition from an industrial to a knowledge society is unfolding a tremendous dynamic. A dynamic that is not without contradictions.

Globalization has brought us immense gains in prosperity. The world gross domestic product roughly doubled between the turn of the millennium and the outbreak of the global financial crisis.

"The global gross domestic product (GDP) increased by around \$1.85 trillion year-on-year to over \$91 trillion in 2021. The world's four largest economies alone, the U.S., China, Japan and Germany, accounted for more than half of global economic output in 2019, with a GDP of nearly \$45 trillion."⁴⁵

"The United States is the largest economy in the world. With a gross domestic product (GDP) of around 21.4 trillion U.S. dollars, the United States occupies first place in the ranking of countries with the largest GDP in 2019. China follows the U.S. with a GDP of around 14.4 trillion U.S. dollars

⁴⁰ Kohl, Dr. Ina, Dreier, Markus, Orth, Ronald, Voigt, Stefan (2010), 'Forschungsbedarf im Wissensmanagement für KMU – Ein Ausblick.' Contribution to the Call for Papers for the Open Journal of Knowledge Management I/2010.

⁴¹ IDG study from 2009 "As the Economy Contracts, the Digital Universe Expands" on behalf of EMC Corporation.

⁴² Tenzer, F., 'Prognose zum weltweit generierten Datenvolumen 2025', <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/267974/umfrage/prognose-zum-weltweit-generierten-datenvolumen/> (Accessed 13 April, 2021).

⁴³ Rüttgers, Jürgen (1999), 'Zeitenwende – Wendezeiten', op. cit. 37, p. 13ff.

⁴⁴ Thurow, Lester (2004), 'Die Zukunft der Weltwirtschaft', Frankfurt am Main.

⁴⁵ <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/159798/umfrage/entwicklung-des-bip-bruttoinlandsprodukt-weltweit/>

in second place by a considerable margin. However, China is not only the largest economy in Asia, but also one of the most powerful states in the world."⁴⁶

In 1990, the volume of global equity trading was \$5.7 trillion. In 2000, it was already 49.8 trillion, and finally 116.1 trillion in 2008.⁴⁷

But there are also losers: According to estimates by the International Labor Organization (ILO) and UNICEF, 160 million children (5 - 17 years old) worldwide still have to work under sometimes unimaginable conditions, and around 250,000 are abused as soldiers.⁴⁸ The Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad) has spiralled downwards in recent years despite aid payments of more than \$5 billion, about half of it from Europe. Even the deployment of 5,000 French and 1,100 German troops could not stop it. The number of internally displaced persons rose to 1.5 million within two years. 13 million people are dependent on emergency aid. 4 million children no longer go to school. "Europe's record in the Sahel is disastrous," writes the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*.⁴⁹

The worldwide financial crisis has also shown the dark side of globalization: Family businesses, banks, insurance companies, industry, even entire states have been on the brink of disaster.

To support the banks alone, EU member states – in effect, taxpayers – provided guarantees and aid totalling nearly 4.6 trillion euro from October 2008 to October 2010.⁵⁰ Hardly anyone can reliably quantify the overall economic impact of the crisis.

All these developments, such as globalization, the transition to a knowledge society, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany and Europe, the demise of the Soviet Union, the rise of China, India and Brazil, the world financial crisis do not mark the "end of history," as U.S. political scientist Francis Fukuyama⁵¹ opined, but the transition to a new world order.

On September 11th, 1990, U.S. President George Bush Sr. caused quite a stir with a speech to the U.S. Congress. The Iron Curtain had fallen. German reunification was imminent. Iraq had invaded its neighbor Kuwait. A broad international coalition was coming together to stop the aggression. Against this backdrop, President Bush Sr. saw a unique moment had come: to announce the beginning of a New World Order. A new era, freed from the threat of terror, stronger and more secure in the pursuit of justice and peace.

⁴⁶ <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/157841/umfrage/ranking-der-20-laender-mit-dem-groessten-bruttoinlandsprodukt/>; Top 20 most powerful countries according to the Best Countries Ranking 2020, <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/732066>.

⁴⁷ Annual reports of the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE); see as well: <https://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/zahlenundfakten/globalisierung/52590/aktien>.

⁴⁸ <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/1243323/umfrage/kinderarbeit-betroffene-minderjaehrige-weltweit/>; <https://www.bmz.de/de/aktuelles/minister-mueller-zum-tag-gegen-kindersoldaten-58890>.

⁴⁹ Urech, Fabian (2021), 'Europas Bilanz im Sahel ist desaströs', *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 12 June, p. 15.

⁵⁰ 'Europa steht mit 4,6 Billionen Euro für Banken gerade', *Zeit online*, 1st December, 2010, <https://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2010-12/europa-banken-hilfen-sonderregeln/> (Accessed 7 July, 2021).

⁵¹ Fukuyama, Francis (1992), op. cit. 32; id., 'The End of history?', in: *The National Interest*. Summer 1989, <https://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm> (Accessed 7 July, 2021).

From today's perspective, this assessment was both premature and visionary. Premature because no one really knew what the new world order would look like. Visionary, because the end of the East-West conflict marked the beginning of the end of a world order.

This world order lasted about 350 years: it is now coming to an end. What is meant is the system of states that was formed in 1648 after the first Thirty Years' War based on the Peace of Münster and Osnabrück. Characterized by classical states, understood as a unity of state, nation, people, culture, and religion.⁵²

Through globalization, through the knowledge society, through globally advancing migration flows, nations and state peoples are no longer identical. The unity of state and religion is history, except for the Islamic states.

The relations between the continents and cultural groups are shifting: In the middle of the 20th century, we Europeans still made-up 21.6 percent of the world's population. By 2050, according to United Nations projections, that figure will be only 7.29 percent.⁵³

V. What is a world order?

But what is a 'world order'? We are witnessing the rise of China and India as new world powers. What role will the U.S. play in the future, what role will Russia play? What about the emerging economies? What role will Europe assume?

In the current debate, several forms of world order are being discussed. Following Harald Müller⁵⁴, the following can be distinguished:

1. Empires

There have been empires throughout history: the Persian Empire, the Roman Empire, the Mongol Empire, the Ottoman Empire, the British Empire. In the last 60 years, both the United States and the Soviet Union have been world powers, to be sure. The 'Cold War' and the division of the world into East and West have prevented an imperial character from developing.

By 'empire' we essentially mean the following: A highly developed center, superior to its surroundings, succeeds in imposing its rule on the surrounding area. Abundant resources, good administration, military superiority, civilizational and cultural progress: all these characteristics make it possible to rule huge territories with comparatively little use of force.

⁵² Münkler, Herfried (2018), 'Tränen des Vaterlandes', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 16 July, p. 7.

⁵³ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019). *World Population Prospects 2019*, Online Edition. Rev. 1; see Zöch, Irene (2009), 'Weltbevölkerung: Europa der schrumpfende Kontinent', in: *Die Presse*, 10 July. In 2009, the estimate for 2050 was still 7.6 percent.

⁵⁴ Müller, Harald (2008), 'Wie kann eine neue Weltordnung aussehen?', bpb Bonn.

At the same time, however, the vast expanse of territory poses its greatest danger for empires. For, the poison that corrodes empires is their over-extension. The British historian Paul Kennedy illustrated this particularly vividly in his work "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers".⁵⁵

2. Hegemony

Another model of world order is hegemony, the gentler alternative to empire. Hegemony requires a lesser expenditure of military force and global presence. Instead, the focus of efforts is on means of soft power: such as economic relations, institutional governance, cultural persuasion, diplomatic skill, and media presence. Ulrich Menzel calls hegemonic "the order in which all can participate in these public goods, and no one is excluded from their enjoyment, while imperial for him means the orders in which these goods are reserved for a limited number of actors".⁵⁶

Consequence: the larger allies play a more independent role and burdens are distributed somewhat more evenly. In return, the hegemon must be more considerate of the interests of the partners.

3. Alliance

This applies even more to the third model of world order: an institutional alliance of democracies. Here the largest power - in our case the USA - slips into the role of 'primus inter pares' in a community of democracies. The practical expression of such a model is the proposal to globalize NATO and to include, for example, Israel, Japan, South Korea, or Australia in the alliance.

However, the implementation of such a model is likely to be extremely difficult: It is quite questionable whether democracies such as Brazil, India or Indonesia will be won over to such a project. In many foreign and security policy issues, these countries often have different views than the USA or the EU states and different interests, for example in economic and ecological matters.

Should Russia, for example, whose democratic constitution is in doubt, also belong to this alliance? Not to mention China. And what relationship should the community of democratic states have with the G8 and the G20? These have grown considerably in importance in recent years.

4. World republic

The fourth model of a world order is that of a world republic. It is based on the cosmopolitan assumption that there will be a progressive global communization of humanity. It crystallizes universal principles and values, for example human rights - across all cultures -, and a 'world domestic policy' - later a world parliament or a world government.

⁵⁵ Kennedy, Paul M. (1989), 'Aufstieg und Fall der großen Mächte. Ökonomischer Wandel und militärischer Konflikt von 1500 bis 2000'. Frankfurt a. M.

⁵⁶ Cited in Münkler, Herfried (2015), 'Wehe, wenn sie ihre Energie nach außen kehren', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 24 June, p. 10.

The fundamental problem with this model is obvious: What is a universally valid set of values for us in the West is far from being so in the eyes of, for example, the Chinese or Iranian governments. On the contrary, the attempt to actively promote the global implementation and anchoring of Western principles is perceived there as a threat: As interference in internal affairs and renewed colonialism.

5. Global governance

Finally, the fifth model of world order is the 'global governance' approach. It essentially assumes a loss of importance of states. Globalization has led to a situation in which political action takes place only in exceptional cases as a purely intergovernmental interaction. Instead, there is now a multitude of actors and networks: International organizations such as the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, the OECD, the WHO, and the WTO, but also non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International and PETA, as well as globally active international companies.

Global governance sees the state as just one of many participants. However, it is often forgotten that states still cooperate with each other in the international organizations themselves. In addition, the question arises whether non-governmental organizations or companies that have no democratic legitimacy can be cooperation partners.

None of the five models is entirely convincing: The United States will remain the central world power for the foreseeable future, without which no new world order can be shaped. As an empire or hegemon, however, the United States alone cannot guarantee such an order: Its economic and cultural dominance has waned in recent years. Even militarily - as shown not least by Iraq and Afghanistan - it has reached its limits.

Moreover, Rüdiger Safranski is right when he writes: "It contradicts all historical experience that an action subject 'humanity' could emerge from the teeming mass of people."⁵⁷ This is certainly true for a long time, perhaps forever, if people want to live in freedom.

In addition, the above models leave out an important question: is the new world order a unipolar or a multipolar one? And what does this imply for concrete foreign policy action under the conditions now prevailing? This question plays a particularly important role in the transatlantic dialogue. This is all the more true since President Obama said in the State of the Union address that American interventions will only take place with other states.⁵⁸ As a result, the United States has become dependent on regional conflicts.

⁵⁷ Safranski, Rüdiger (2003), op. cit. 24.

⁵⁸ Lau, Jörg (2016), 'Möge die Macht mit dir sein!', *Die ZEIT* Nr. 2, 7 January, p. 8; see also transcript of the address by Barack Obama from 12 January, 2016: "[...] on issues of global concern, we will mobilize the world to work with us, and make sure other countries pull their own weight", <https://www.npr.org/2016/01/12/462831088/president-obama-state-of-the-union-transcript?t=1625684297696> (Accessed 28 June, 2021)

Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger sees a new bipolar order emerging with a Pacific center of gravity.⁵⁹ In his view, America's decline and China's rise mean that the two states must cooperate with each other. Neither can dominate the other. Conflict between them would endanger world peace.

VI. World power People's Republic of China

China is moving forward step by step to expand its influence in the world. Chinese President Xi, whose power rests as it did in Mao's day on his office as head of state and as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and chairman of the Central Military Commission, wants to make his country the world's No. 1.⁶⁰

By 2049, China's People's Liberation Army is to be upgraded to a "world-class army."⁶¹ China is spending more and more on its armed forces. From 2010 to 2019, the defense budget "nearly doubled." In some branches of the armed forces, such as the "navy," China has already surpassed the United States. China already has "nearly 360 ships, including two aircraft carriers and six nuclear ballistic missile submarines."⁶²

China has also surpassed the U.S. in integrated air defense. This includes Russian air defense systems. American planning exercises assume that "Taiwanese air power could be taken out within minutes, U.S. bases in the Pacific attacked, American ships and aircraft kept at bay by Chinese missiles."⁶³ China seeks "reunification with Taiwan, militarily if necessary."⁶⁴ The U.S. and its main ally, Japan, therefore also want to keep their shipping lanes open.⁶⁵

In Washington, senior military officials believe that "war could break out over Taiwan within six years."⁶⁶ Admiral James Stavridis is therefore calling for arms control talks between the U.S., China, and Russia. At the same time, the U.S. should reach agreements with friendly countries, such as "the so-called Quad, which is the U.S., Japan, India and Australia," supplemented by South Korea and Singapore. This is not to be a NATO-like organization because that would be a very "provocative message to China."⁶⁷ Germany will send a frigate to the Western Pacific in the summer of 2021. "This sends a significant signal to China: you do not own these waters; this is international maritime territory."⁶⁸

Other criteria in the comparison between China and the United States are economics and innovation. The West should not make the mistake of assuming that new economic liberalization and

⁵⁹ Kissinger, Henry (2010), 'Der Abstieg Amerikas', *Handelsblatt*, 17/18 December.

⁶⁰ Rüttgers, Jürgen (2015), 'Kalter Krieg oder Neue Weltordnung? Zur Rolle Deutschlands und Europas in einer multi-polaren Weltordnung', *Regierungsforschung.de*, 18 March, p. 4.

⁶¹ Busse, Nikolas (2021), 'Chinas neue Muskeln', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12 April, p. 8.

⁶² Busse, Nikolas (2021), op. cit. 61, p. 8.

⁶³ Busse, Nikolas (2021), op. cit. 61, p. 8.

⁶⁴ Boge, Friederike (2021), 'Pekings gefährlicher Traum', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 1 March, p. 8.

⁶⁵ Kölling, Martin (2021), 'Japan rüstet aus Angst vor China auf', *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 12 June, p. 5.

⁶⁶ Ackerman, Elliot, Stavridis, Admiral James (2021), '2034: A Novel of the Next World War', *Penguin Press*, cited in Zand, Bernhard (2021), "Es wäre naiv zu sagen, China sei kein Problem", Interview in *Der Spiegel*, 14 April, p. 86.

⁶⁷ Ackerman, Elliot, Stavridis, Admiral James (2021), op. cit. 66, p. 88.

⁶⁸ Ackerman, Elliot, Stavridis, Admiral James (2021), op. cit. 66, p. 88.

"growing prosperity and closer connectivity with the rest of the world" will inevitably lead to political liberalization.⁶⁹ Nevertheless, China wants to be among the most innovative countries in the world by 2035. As in other countries, such as the U.S. and Germany, China has experienced a sharp decline in research productivity (Germany down 5.2% annually, U.S. 5.3%, China 23.8%).⁷⁰

Under Deng Xiaoping, China has "reformed the economy and strengthened the role of market forces and incentives." A certain degree of private ownership has been allowed, foreign investment has been made possible, and integration into international trade has been promoted.⁷¹

In addition, the Chinese economy has achieved great economic policy success in recent decades. Comparisons are repeatedly published around the world on the progress of societies' development, economy, military power, and stability. It is true that President Trump had abandoned economic competition with China. During this period, China tried to reduce its dependence on exports, which failed.

The enormous debt of the state sector, the overcapacity of heavy industry and the weakness of domestic consumption remain burdensome. The population decline of five million people annually as a result of the former one-child policy, the shortage of labor and the ailing pension system threaten social peace. The promise at the 2021 centennial celebrations to build a "moderately prosperous society" is proving difficult.⁷²

Over Xi Jinping and his authoritarian rule, the "gap between rich and poor, unimaginable corruption among state officials, the increasingly poor quality of air and water, the lack of a welfare system" are opening up instead.⁷³

Against this background, the states of the free West should not "be blinded by China's successes, which are often exaggerated by the media [...]. China's economy remains very unproductive."⁷⁴ According to Mikko Huotari, director of the Mercator Institute for China Studies (Merics), the U.S., Germany, Sweden, the U.K., and Japan are ahead of China's economy in terms of gross domestic product per capita in average annual dollars. China is also not in the top ranks in terms of international competitiveness. In China's industrial policy, the state is trying to make key industries more competitive with massive investment. However, there is "incredible waste" in practice. - "China has been investing billions of dollars in the semiconductor industry for decades in order to become less

⁶⁹ Kafsack, Hendrik (2021), 'Doping im Fitnessclub', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 1 June, p. 17.

⁷⁰ Böing, Philipp, Hünermund, Paul (2020), 'Chinas große Forschungsmission', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 21 December, p. 16; id. (2020), 'More R&D, Less Growth? China's Decreasing Research Productivity in International Comparison', *ZEWpolicy brief*, No. 20-08, December, p. 1f., <https://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/policybrief/en/pb08-20.pdf>.

⁷¹ Acemoglu, Daron, Robinson, James A. (2013), 'Warum Nationen scheitern', Frankfurt a. M., p. 499.

⁷² Zand, Bernhard (2021), 'Der Siegeszug des Drachen', *Der Spiegel*, 23 January, p. 10ff. Meanwhile, a "three-child policy" has been introduced.

⁷³ Ankenbrand, Hendrik (2021), 'Chinas neue Planwirtschaft', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 4 March, p. 19.

⁷⁴ Pennekamp, Johannes (2021), 'Soziale Marktwirtschaft in der Zange', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 21 April, p. 19; Kafsack, Hendrik (2021), op. cit. 69, p. 17.

dependent on imports," he said. 'But it has not succeeded in any way in becoming internationally competitive.'"75

The Chinese leadership is trying to counter the looming fiasco by stepping up the Silk Road (one belt, one road) project and signing new agreements with other countries. Because the "secret" agreements with Chinese lenders and development aid countries are becoming increasingly unattractive, because "projects [...] are financed by Chinese loans and built by Chinese companies," trade with the Third World is also declining.⁷⁶ That's why the surprise deal between the EU and China in late 2020 was possible because the Chinese government suddenly made significant concessions after seven years of tough negotiations. Admittedly, the EU's investment agreement with China (CAI) is "on hold" according to the European Parliament. What is necessary, however, is that for all the problems with the People's Republic, the EU must look after its own economic interests.⁷⁷ The Asian RCEP pact with Japan, South Korea, and Australia and another 12 countries is also important for China's standing in the world. China also hopes to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, which Trump has rejected.⁷⁸

It remains to be seen which path new U.S. President Joe Biden will take and whether he will succeed in "stabilizing the fractured Sino-American relationship and shaping a common China strategy for the West."⁷⁹ German political scientist Professor Xuewu Gu believes that the crucial weakness of the Chinese system is "that it is not based on political values but on economic performance."⁸⁰

Europe, and Germany in particular, will have to adjust to 'de-globalization,' such as in the struggle for "control of critical areas involving raw materials and strategic products (such as semiconductors) and, more generally, supply chains. Even more fundamentally, the restructuring of political and economic power will depend on who controls data collection and use around the world."⁸¹ Europe faces the question of how its security will be ensured in the future.

"Since economic performance is always cyclical, systemic stability is exposed to many extra-systemic factors such as the recession of the world economy or slowdowns in the economies of the main trading partner countries. [...] The West will not be able to avoid the fate of permanent disappointment if it always thinks in terms of 'modernization theory,' namely by assuming that economic liberalization in China will inevitably lead to political liberalization."⁸² Europe must understand that the "American promise of protection for Europe" must be readjusted to meet strategic challenges because "China is tying up America's military power in the Pacific."⁸³ According to European

⁷⁵ Cited in Pennekamp, Johannes (2021), op. cit. 74, p. 19.

⁷⁶ Deuber, Lea (2021), 'Wie China andere Länder mit Krediten gängelt', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 1/2 April, p. 17.

⁷⁷ Kafsack, Hendrik (2021), 'Gemeinsam gegen China', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 21 May, p. 15.

⁷⁸ Zand, Bernhard (2021), op. cit. 72, p. 12; Deuber, Lea, Krüger, Paul-Anton (2021), 'Zum Einstand eine Warnung', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 22 January, p. 2.

⁷⁹ Zand, Bernhard (2021), op. cit. 72, p. 10.

⁸⁰ Gu, Xuewu (2014), 'Die Große Mauer in den Köpfen', bpb Bonn, p. 192-194.

⁸¹ De Montbrial, Thierry (2021), 'Einstieg ins 21. Jahrhundert', *Quarterly*, Spring Edition, 'Das Dreieck EU-USA-China', 30 March, ip-quarterly.com/en/stepping-into-21st-century (Accessed 22 May, 2021).

⁸² Gu, Xuewu (2014), 'Die Große Mauer in den Köpfen', op. cit. 80, p. 192-193.

⁸³ Terhalle, Maximilian (2021), 'In die Arme Chinas?', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 13 February, p. 10.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, "Europe must learn the language of power," a new word in the European vocabulary.⁸⁴

VII. World power Russia

When Russia's President Putin invaded Crimea in 2014, war came back to Europe. Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula. As justification, Putin cited in his state of the nation address on December 04th, 2014, that the "spiritual origin of the great Russian nation" was located there. He spoke of the "sacred significance of Crimea" for his country.⁸⁵ Putin thus also wanted to rally his country behind a "Russian idea based on Christianity, on the people conceived as one, on the renunciation of the West and on the rule of a strong leader."⁸⁶ With the annexation of the Crimean peninsula in violation of international law, Russia launched an undeclared, asymmetric war in eastern Ukraine to destabilize it. This not only permanently disrupted Ukraine's relationship with Russia. Eastern European member states like Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia also feared to become embroiled in a war with Russia. The result was a growing fear of further aggression. Ukraine was destabilized. Russia-friendly President Yanukovich broke off association negotiations with the EU and advocated joining the Eurasian Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The result was mass demonstrations on the Maidan, Freedom Square in Kiev. The newly elected President Poroshenko resumed negotiations with the EU. The agreement was signed on September 16th, 2014. Putin's strategy to divide Ukraine succeeded. His goal of reincorporating the entire country into the Russian Federation failed. Internally, Putin sold the annexation and accession of Crimea and the rescue of the Russian Navy's port in Sevastopol as a great success. The attempt to take back the Donbass region failed because Ukraine granted "near autonomy rights" to the rulers there.⁸⁷

The West responded with protests, sanctions, the redeployment of NATO troops to eastern member states. The construction of a bridge to the Crimean Peninsula, the granting of Russian citizenship, and the redeployment of hundreds of thousands of Russian troops to the western border, declared as an exercise, damaged Russia's relationship with the West. The Russian economy was permanently damaged. His attempt to restore the former borders of the Soviet zone of influence failed. Putin "entangled himself in the quagmire of the conflict in eastern Ukraine for the unforeseeable future."⁸⁸ Further military engagements in Syria, support for Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon, the use of hackers around the world and the related attempt to destabilize the democratic West and empower right-wing and left-wing radicals, the crackdown on government opponents, attacks with warfare agents, cyberattacks failed, for the most part.⁸⁹

⁸⁴ Ladurner, Ulrich (2019), "Madame, übernehmen Sie", Interview, *Die Zeit*, 28 November, p. 6.

⁸⁵ 'Rede an die Nation, Putin sieht Russland als Opfer des Westens', *Der Spiegel*, 4 December 2014, <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/russland-putin-haelt-rede-an-die-nation-a-1006527.html> (Accessed 21 July, 2021).

⁸⁶ Rüttgers, Jürgen, 'Kalter Krieg oder Neue Weltordnung?', op. cit. 60, p. 3.

⁸⁷ Kershaw, Ian (2018), 'Achterbahn, Europa bis heute', Munich, p. 727.

⁸⁸ Kershaw, Ian (2018), op. cit. 87, p. 722ff.

⁸⁹ Sattar, Majid, Schmidt, Friedrich (2021), 'Entspannung auf niedrigem Niveau?', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 15 June, p. 8.

Then-U.S. President Obama "derided Russia" as a "regional power" that threatened its neighbors. This behavior resulted "not from strength, but from weakness."⁹⁰

For Putin, as he said in his April 2005 State of the Union address, the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union was "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe" of the 20th century.⁹¹

Time and again, he even defended the 'Hitler-Stalin Pact,' calling it a "peace-keeping measure." "Behind it is an ideology that derives the license to attack from fear of threat to this day."⁹²

In view of this instability and the "new role of Russia, [the] sprawl of China, severe conflicts worldwide such as the war in Syria" and further conflicts in the Middle East, Turkey and the European Union, the head of the Munich Security Conference Wolfgang Ischinger speaks of an "epochal break" already in 2018.⁹³

How could Putin, despite or because of all the lies, falsehoods, violations of law, wars, civil wars, murders, and digital attacks, expand his power without being stopped by the states of the West?

Putin stated his conviction in an interview with the Financial Times: "The liberal idea has outlived its usefulness; it is in conflict with the overwhelming majority of the people."⁹⁴ To be sure, Putin is no ideologue. But he knows there are "a lot of allies" in Western countries. "Whether it's Front National in France, whether it's Fidesz (or even Jobbik) in Hungary, whether it's PiS in Poland, FPÖ in Austria or AfD in Germany - for large parts of these parties, liberalism embodies the evil of this world, from which their own country and people must be protected. They all work to push boundaries, moral as well as political ones."⁹⁵ Liberalism for them is democracy, the rule of law, human and civil rights, international law. But these they do not want. For them, the 'army of hybrid war' includes scientific institutions like the 'Russian Institute for Strategic Research', but also, as in the Crimean War, the Orthodox Church, individual oligarchs, ultra-right parties in the West, journalists, print media and digital publication. This includes 'fake news' and 'troll factories'. These process rumors, write posts and comments against the respective opposition. They intervene in the election campaigns of Western candidates and parties or hack democratic institutions, authorities, and companies.⁹⁶ Even in German parties such as the SPD and Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen there are strong

⁹⁰ Obama derides Russia as "regional power", www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article126190584/, 25 March, 2014, (Accessed 27 May, 2021).

⁹¹ Wehner, Marcus (2014), "Ich denke dabei nicht nur an die Krim", faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/13139437.html, 8 September, 2014 (Accessed 27 May, 2021).

⁹² Schuller, Konrad (2019), 'Putins Geschichten', 29 December, <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/warum-wladimir-putin-den-hitler-stalin-pakt-verteidigt-16556166.html>; Schmidt, Friedrich (2015), 'Hitler-Stalin-Pakt, „Ein kolossaler Erfolg“', 14 May, <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/putin-verteidigt-den-hitler-stalin-pakt-13587368.html> (Accessed 20 October); Pedziwol, Aureliusz Marek (2020), 'Zweiter Weltkrieg, Hitler-Stalin-Pakt: Putins Geschichtsklitterung', 20 June, <https://www.dw.com/de/hitler-stalin-pakt-putins-geschichtsklitterung/a-53878252>, (Accessed 26 October).

⁹³ Sandberg, Britta, von Rohr, Mathieu (2018), "Wir erleben einen neuen Epochenbruch", *Spiegel* Interview with Wolfgang Ischinger, *Der Spiegel* Nr. 36, 1 September, p. 82ff.

⁹⁴ Bota, Alice (2019), 'Putins Brüder', *Die Zeit*, 4 July, p. 1.

⁹⁵ Bota, Alice (2019), op. cit. 94, p. 1.

⁹⁶ Eidman, Igor (2018), "Russland probt den ersten hybriden Weltkrieg", *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 17 March, p. 18. The author is cousin of the murdered opposition politician Boris Nemtsov and lives in Leipzig since 2011; Balsler, Markus, Brössler, Daniel (2021), 'Schwachstelle Mensch', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 22/23/24 May, p. 7.

forces representing a 'third way policy', which means a 'German special way' between the USA and Russia. Historian Heinrich August Winkler described this position as a "'turning away from the western connection of the Federal Republic,' which had become the (West) German *raison d'état* since Adenauer's day."⁹⁷ Alexander Gallus further points out that the basic understanding of Egon Bahr and Gerhard Schröder, "as well as that of earlier and current representatives of an America- and NATO-sceptical course within the SPD, no matter whether more nationally, European, or pacifistically motivated, [...] [was] neither anti-liberal nor even anti-democratic. They always understood the Third Way ideas in political-social terms as an alternative Western way that relied on a balance of security and freedom."⁹⁸

Bernd Ulrich, on the other hand, believes that Putin "does not have a master plan to destroy Europe" because "with an elaborate plan, he would merely bind himself in the end."⁹⁹ Rather, he wants "eye level with the U.S., a portioned Europe, a somewhat weakened Germany, they want to keep everything down that could resemble an Arab, Ukrainian or even Russian Spring, because they see the core of anarchy in it. Moreover, after the 'Third Rome' and communism, they want to create a new mission that orchestrates their power internationally - a mixture of authoritarianism, slightly racial nationalism, traditional Christianity aggressive against sexual minorities in combination with military power politics."¹⁰⁰

When the 'Great European Freedom Revolution of 1989/90' enabled the reunification of Germany and Europe with the consent of all neighbors and also the victorious powers of World War II, the Cold War ended. At that time, the United States and the Soviet Union were looking for ways to a common future. Gorbachev tried to stabilize his reform course with the help of the West, especially Germany.¹⁰¹

Against the backdrop of the war in Iraq, the new U.S.-Soviet cooperation proved itself for the first time. Iraq was an old ally of Moscow. The personal relationship between Bush and Gorbachev was viable. Both wanted to create a new world order.¹⁰² But the dream was shattered. Gorbachev was unable to implement his ideas of perestroika and glasnost. Gorbachev's requests for financial aid could not be fulfilled by Bush because domestic issues took precedence shortly before his re-election. Senate Democratic Majority Leader George Mitchell urged him to "get our own house in order."¹⁰³ Bush's opponent, Buchanan, attacked him aggressively, saying, "He believes in a *pax universalis*; we believe in the republic. He would put America's wealth and power in the service of a vague new world order; we put America first (America First)."¹⁰⁴ As a result, the U.S. raised only \$2.5 billion in aid. Germany, by contrast, had put up about \$40 billion.¹⁰⁵ Gorbachev was succeeded

⁹⁷ Winkler, Heinrich August, cited in Gallus, Alexander (2020), 'Gemeinsame Werte, gemeinsame Waffen?', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12 October, p. 6.

⁹⁸ Gallus, Alexander (2020), op. cit. 97.

⁹⁹ Ulrich, Bernd (2016), "Wladimir Putin: Ist er so perfide ... oder sind wir so dumm?", *Die Zeit*, 11 February, p. 3.

¹⁰⁰ Ulrich, Bernd (2016), op. cit. 99, p. 3.

¹⁰¹ Winkler, Heinrich August (2014), 'Geschichte des Westens, Vom Kalten Krieg zum Mauerfall', Munich, p. 1096ff.

¹⁰² Spohr, Kristina (2019), op. cit. 8, p. 423ff.

¹⁰³ Spohr, Kristina (2019), *ibid.*, p. 425.

¹⁰⁴ Spohr, Kristina (2019), *ibid.*, p. 601.

¹⁰⁵ Spohr, Kristina (2019), op. cit. 8, p. 574.

by Boris Yeltsin, who as Russian prime minister pushed Gorbachev out of office.¹⁰⁶ Boris Yeltsin even considered Russian accession to NATO possible "in the long term."¹⁰⁷ "Russia plunged into an abyss of failed democracy and oligarchic capitalism in the 1990s under Yeltsin. Only Putin stabilized the country again and reasserted Russian identity."¹⁰⁸ He failed, however, to restore Russia's status as a world power.

It is true that talks between the U.S., NATO and Russia on a joint security partnership had already taken place during Yeltsin's time in office. However, all efforts were unsuccessful. The reason was ultimately that Russia believed it had been deceived by the West during the weak phase of Yeltsin's term. To this day, it is disputed what was agreed by whom in the U.S.-Russian talks at the time. It is true that the reasons for the failure were, on the one hand, "the self-image of Russian security; the perceived disregard for Russian interests; and the 'dignity' of Russia."¹⁰⁹ However, many voices, including in the West, claim that the main reason was NATO's expansion beyond the then eastern border of the GDR. The talks between Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl had already been based on a commitment "agreed to by [then] U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in his negotiations on German reunification with Gorbachev in early February 1990."¹¹⁰ Baker's formulation was "Not one inch eastward."¹¹¹ Because NATO's eastward expansion nevertheless took place, Klaus von Dohnanyi believes that the NATO issue "[has] now also created the most difficult obstacle to a revival of the policy of détente: the annexation of Crimea."¹¹² He adds that "it would be France's and Germany's urgent foreign policy task" to launch a diplomatic offensive against Russia while "illusionlessly strengthening our independent defense. For our interest is a peaceful, secure, but also sovereign Europe."¹¹³

As much as this strategic analysis is captivating, it begs the question of whether, in light of the ever larger and more diverse conflicts that Russia has sparked in recent years, it is not becoming increasingly difficult to create the conditions for a European policy of détente.

In this regard, the traces of President Obama's European policy and that of his successor, Trump, remain clear. For years, NATO members have failed to implement the additional investments already agreed upon.¹¹⁴

In contrast, Russia has continued to invest massively in military potential. Putin is concerned with "regaining influence in the post-Soviet space and in more distant regions of the world where Moscow was once an important player. [...] Putin [...] [does not believe] he can restore the imperial

¹⁰⁶ Spohr, Kristina (2019), *ibid.*, p. 593.

¹⁰⁷ Schmid, Ulrich (2021), 'Vom Beitrittswunsch zur Bedrohung', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 18 May, p. 6.

¹⁰⁸ Spohr, Kristina (2019), *op. cit.* 8, p. 788.

¹⁰⁹ von Dohnanyi, Klaus (2019), 'Russland im Visier', *Die Zeit*, 19 June, p. 40.

¹¹⁰ von Dohnanyi, Klaus (2019), *op. cit.* 109, p. 40; Schmid, Ulrich (2017), *op. cit.* 107, p. 6.

¹¹¹ Schmid, Ulrich (2017), *op. cit.* 107, p. 6.; Winkler, Heinrich August (2015), *op. cit.* 28, p. 103ff.

¹¹² von Dohnanyi, Klaus (2019), *op. cit.* 109, p. 40; Fukuyama, Francis (2019), *Identität, 'Wie der Verlust der Würde unserer Demokratie gefährdet'*, Hamburg, p. 24.

¹¹³ von Dohnanyi, Klaus (2019), *op. cit.* 109, p. 40.

¹¹⁴ Ernst, Andreas (2018), 'Die Nato auf einer Gratwanderung', *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 14 July, p. 3.

grandeur of the Soviet empire. But he is recognizably thinking in the bipolar categories of the 20th century."¹¹⁵

In recent years, the Kremlin has neither reformed nor stabilized the great country's economy through investment. Putin invests the revenues from oil and gas in the military and in the global military conflicts he pursues. At the same time, he must invest in new missiles and nuclear weapons to keep up with the United States and NATO. To cater to the national sentiments of his citizens, Putin has to organize regular displays of his strength to convince the population of the country's strength. For example, in the spring of 2021, more than a hundred thousand Russian troops, including equipment, were moved near the Ukrainian border as a show of strength against Ukraine and to deter it from further attempts to become a member of NATO. The Russian-backed 'hybrid' war in the Donbass has already made accession ultimately unrealistic.¹¹⁶ At the same time, the Kremlin has made new claims to mineral resources and shipping routes. Ahead of the May 2021 meeting of the 'Arctic Council,' Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated his country's claims of ownership in the Arctic. Russia is also massively arming itself in this region. The expansion of the passage, which is free of ice due to climate change, with new ports, ships and rail routes is to be prioritized by 2035.¹¹⁷

The murder of Russian citizens in London and Berlin, the assassination attempt on Russian opposition figure Navalny, and the cyber and hacker attacks on Western politicians as well as European companies and authorities have also caused lasting disruption to the relationship between the European Union and its member states.¹¹⁸ The large number of human rights and international law violations put a massive strain on Europe's relationship with Russia. The West has no consistent strategy for dealing with Russia. Europe cannot defeat Moscow with sanctions. It can only drive up prices for Moscow and prevent a Sino-Russian alliance. Only together with the U.S. Europe's security, especially in the Eastern European member states, can be guaranteed.¹¹⁹

VIII. World power USA

In 2003, Robert Kagan¹²⁰, in his sensational book 'Power and Weakness', saw a deep gulf between Europe and the USA. According to this, we Europeans live on Venus, while the Americans live on Mars. In Kagan's opinion, Europeans have entered the Kantian world of eternal peace within their own borders. They lived in a postmodern system based on the rejection of military power and self-imposed rules of conduct. The USA, on the other hand, continued to see itself in an anarchic Hobbesian world. In it, international rules and international law cannot be relied upon. True security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order depend on the possession and use of military power. In Kagan's view, the United States, as a kind of benevolent hegemon, should show respect for

¹¹⁵ Busse, Nikolas (2021), 'Der letzte kalte Krieger', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30 April, p. 1.

¹¹⁶ Bigalke, Silke (2021), 'Das Trommeln wird lauter', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 17/18 April, p. 8; Schmidt, Friedrich, Gnauck, Gerhard (2021), 'An der Schwelle zum Krieg', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 8 April, p. 5.

¹¹⁷ Manenkov, Kostya, Isachenkov, Vladimir (2021), 'Wettlauf um die Arktis', *Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger*, 25 May, p. 9.

¹¹⁸ Kolb, Mathias (2021), 'Moskau soll nicht mitlauschen', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 22/23/24 May, p. 9.

¹¹⁹ Hoffmann, Christiane (2021), 'Hart, aber pragmatisch', *Der Spiegel Nr. 22*, 29 May, p. 6.

¹²⁰ Kagan, Robert (2003), 'Macht und Ohnmacht', Berlin.

multilateralism and the rule of law. However, it should not allow itself to authoritatively be limited in its options for action.

The British-American historian Tony Judt¹²¹, one of the most astute observers of European post-war history, noted as early as 2005 that Europe and the United States were drifting apart. In his opinion, this was not due to military and economic inequalities. Rather, he noted an increasing disagreement on the question of values - in contrast to Kagan as a critically distanced representative of the European side.

However, his remarks on the 'History of Europe since 1945' are interesting above all because, in his view, nations and states would also endure in the world of the 21st century. That we live in a post-national or post-state world is an illusion. We would pay too much attention to globalized economic processes and assume that similar transnational developments must also take place in all other areas of life. Nationalism, he said, has essentially come and gone, but nations and states have remained.

Francis Fukuyama believes that it is ultimately "the inner sense of dignity that urges recognition." It is not enough "that I have a sense of self-worth if other people do not publicly acknowledge it or, worse, if they belittle me or fail to take note of my existence. Self-esteem emerges from respect by others." Fukuyama believes that identity politics "consequently encompasses much of the political struggle of the contemporary world: from democratic revolutions to new social movements, from nationalism and Islamism to contemporary university politics."¹²²

In a 1992 essay, sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf¹²³ saw the end of the post-war order in the decoupling of the dollar from gold announced on August 15th, 1971, by then U.S. President Richard Nixon. The consequences were the end of the Bretton Woods system and fluctuating exchange rates. This was the sign that the USA had abandoned the 'Pax Americana' of the post-war period.

Dahrendorf saw this as creating an international order that had "gone even further down the road from Kant to Hobbes than was foreseeable in the early 1980s." Today, he said, we live in a world without order, in which power relations play a dominant role. His conclusion: "Rarely has the need for global rules been more evident than today."

The world financial crisis of 2008 / 2010 has shown us how right Dahrendorf was with this assessment. This was not only an economic crisis. It is also a crisis of design and a moral crisis.

The British historian Timothy Garton Ash¹²⁴ sees the crisis of the world order primarily in the poor state of transatlantic relations. In his treatise "Free World" he blames this on an imbalance of power: The United States and Europe are on an equal footing economically. Militarily and culturally, however, America is clearly superior for the foreseeable future. In addition, there is what Timothy

¹²¹ Judt, Tony (2006), op. cit. 4, p. 706ff.

¹²² Fukuyama, Francis (2019), op. cit. 112, p. 27.

¹²³ Dahrendorf, Ralf (1992), 'Der moderne soziale Konflikt', Stuttgart, p. 179ff.

¹²⁴ Ash, Timothy Garton (2004), 'Freie Welt. Europa, Amerika und die Chance der Krise', bpb Bonn.

Garton Ash calls the "American faith": a strong belief in freedom, universal values, and God. Contemporary Europe, he said, had nothing comparable to offer.¹²⁵

Americans were debating, Ash said, whether the United States should act unilaterally or multilaterally in the new world order. The European debate, on the other hand, revolves around the conceptual pair of 'Euro-Gaullism' versus 'Euro-Atlanticism,' he said. Both debates would influence each other: A Gaullist Europe would fuel the tendency toward unilateral action in the United States. Likewise, an Atlanticist Europe would strengthen advocates of a multilateral framework for action in the United States. Both would also be true the other way around.

The world financial crisis has shown that the debate about the rules of globalization and the resulting structures of a new world order is not a theoretical discussion. All over the globe, since the 'Great European Freedom Revolution of 1989/90' that led to the reunification of Germany and Europe, there has been discussion about what the new world order should or will look like.¹²⁶

Two new books have appeared in 2019 that propose two fundamentally different solutions. Titled 'Has The West Lost It?', Kishore Mahbubani, professor of public policy at the National University in Singapore, argues that the West can no longer impose its ideology on the world. His book is therefore "a provocation" when he asks the question, "Has the West lost?" He sees it as a world order in which China is number one.

The aforementioned Robert Kagan has written a book called 'The Jungle Grows Back'. "The jungle, for Kagan, is the others, the non-Western, the authoritarian states that didn't respect human rights and were aggressive overall. They could determine the world order if the West did not resist them."¹²⁷

Mahbubani predicts that China "will be the strongest economic power in the world." To him, that is a return to normalcy because China and India were the world's largest economies until 1820, he said. "This would historically underpin a Chinese claim to dominance."¹²⁸ Kagan, on the other hand, considers "the 'seven-plus decades' after World War II [to be] 'a relative paradise.'" "If America did not set the boundaries for the world, Kagan's basic thesis goes, the villains of history would feel free to act wickedly. Relative paradise would be lost."¹²⁹ Kagan wants to defend the "liberal order in Asia [...]. In Europe, this applies accordingly vis-à-vis Russia."

Mahbubani, on the other hand, sets the "'3-M strategy': minimalism, multilateralism, Machiavellianism. [...] The West should largely stay out of it, leave the others alone. 'The world does not need

¹²⁵ Ash, Timothy Garton (2004), *ibid.*, p. 160ff.

¹²⁶ Rüttgers, Jürgen (2019), 'Guten Morgen, Europa!', *op. cit.* 22, p. 23.

¹²⁷ Kurbjuweit, Dirk (2019), 'Welt ohne Gärtner', *Der Spiegel* Nr. 7, 9 February, p. 105.

¹²⁸ Kurbjuweit, Dirk (2019), *op. cit.* 127, p. 105.

¹²⁹ Kurbjuweit, Dirk (2019), *op. cit.* 127, p. 105f.

to be saved by the West, does not need lessons about governance structures or moral claims.' It certainly doesn't need to be bombed."¹³⁰

Spiegel deputy editor-in-chief Kurbjuweit sums it up as follows: "Kagan's approach is too offensive. He finds it hard to believe that the West can impose a world order against China. The goal, he says, must be a stalemate, a peaceful coexistence, but one that needs weapons, as a deterrent, as in the Cold War, because China is arming itself heavily. The West cannot be as trusting, as euphoric, as Mahbubani pretends to be. Otherwise, it would have to fit into the Chinese world order, and that could be relative hell for a liberal democrat."¹³¹

Globalization cannot be stopped. And a new world order will emerge. Any power vacuum will be filled. Europeans must therefore ask themselves what role they want to play in the new world order and how it should be shaped.

The fact is that political shaping is possible, indeed necessary. After all, every new world order needs an institutional framework. Globalization also needs rules, as the world financial crisis has shown.

First: There is no way back to the classical nation-state as a unity of nation, people, state, culture, and religion. This does not mean that the state will not continue to play an important role in the future. As Tony Judt noted in his book 'Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century': "Only the state can provide its citizens with framework conditions for a good and fulfilling life - inner peace, solidarity with the disadvantaged, expansion of infrastructure, cultural facilities, environmental protection, free medical care, good educational facilities and the like."¹³²

However, we need a new, decentralized understanding of the state in the sense of the principle of subsidiarity, with sovereignties and competences at several levels. The founder of the Paneuropean Union and first recipient of the Charlemagne Prize of Aachen, Richard Nikolaus Graf von Coudenhove-Kalergi, prophesied this to a certain extent as early as the 1920s: "The future separation of nation and state will be as great a cultural deed as the separation of church and state. The concept of a 'state people' will outlive itself just as much as the concept of a state church [...]."¹³³

Second, we need a reform of international state cooperation, especially of the United Nations. The binding nature of its decisions must be strengthened. To this end, above all, the composition of the Security Council must be adapted to today's geopolitical realities.

Other approaches to an international legal order, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the World Health Organization (WHO) or the International Criminal Court, must also be strengthened under the guiding principle of juridification.

¹³⁰ Kurbjuweit, Dirk (2019), op. cit. 127, p. 107.

¹³¹ Kurbjuweit, Dirk (2019), op. cit. 127, p. 108.

¹³² Judt, Tony (2010), 'Das vergessene Jahrhundert', bpb Bonn, p. 16 and p. 414f.

¹³³ Rüttgers, Jürgen (2016), 'Mehr Demokratie in Europa', op. cit. 32, p. 78ff.

Third: Francis Bacon's famous dictum is: "Knowledge is power."¹³⁴ This is truer today than ever before. An essential core area of political action in the knowledge society is education policy. It will be increasingly important to take as many people as possible with us on the path to a knowledge society. Education is the only way to give people opportunities in life. This is why Lord Dahrendorf spoke of a "civil right to education."¹³⁵

Fourth: The social market economy is and remains the most successful economic and social model in the world. This has been demonstrated once again in the world financial crisis. However, it is inconceivable without freedom and democracy.

IX. Europe's role in the new world order

What does this mean for Europe?

Europe today stands

- for democracy, peace and freedom,
- for the unconditional recognition of human dignity and the right to life and physical integrity,
- for the prohibition of torture, slavery and forced labor,
- for the equality of men and women,
- for freedom of speech and religion,
- for the freedom of art and science,
- for economic reason and social justice.¹³⁶

And it stands for the institutionalized cooperation of states which, as a community based on the rule of law, resolve conflicts among themselves peacefully. It is thus a model for a new peace order that can replace the order of the Peace of Westphalia of Münster and Osnabrück in Europe. A model that will continue to be a project of values and not a technocratic project.

The European Union is the institutional vanguard in the age of globalization. It is neither a confederation of states nor a federal state. It is something entirely new. It is already a state today because it has a territory, state power and a state people. But it does not have full sovereignty. The European Union and the member states share sovereignty.¹³⁷ It is therefore not a central power, but a complicated multi-level system in the sense of subsidiarity.

The EU is already a model for other regional groupings such as the 'United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement' (USMCA), the EU's MERCOSUR trade agreement with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the African Union.

¹³⁴ Bacon, Francis, in *Der Große Brockhaus*, Wiesbaden 1952, p. 570.

¹³⁵ Dahrendorf, Ralf (1965), 'Bildung ist Bürgerrecht. Plädoyer für eine aktive Bildungspolitik', Osnabrück.

¹³⁶ Rüttgers, Jürgen (2017), 'Geschichte und Zukunft des Vereinten Europas', op. cit. 3, p. 29.

¹³⁷ Rüttgers, Jürgen (2016), 'Mehr Demokratie in Europa', op. cit. 32, p. 43 ff.

Europe, on the other hand, must succeed in preserving its essence, its fundamental values and achievements, even in the globalized world of the 21st century. To do so, however, it must continue to develop. The key questions in this context are: What do we do about European integration? Do we stick with the institutional status quo or create a genuine political union? Do we remain - to use the words of the German Federal Constitutional Court - a 'union of states' or does the vision of a 'United Europe' become reality?

Europe must further develop a new form of its own statehood to master the challenges of the global world of the 21st century. To this end, six points are of central importance:

1. We need a common economic policy. There can be no common currency in the long run without a common economic policy. If the European Union is considered as a single market and internal EU trade is subtracted, EU exports were 15.5 percent worldwide in 2017. The U.S. share was 11.1 percent and China's share was 16.2 percent.¹³⁸

2. We must preserve the European model of the social market economy and develop it further for digitization. After all, it is precisely the balance of economic reason and social justice that makes Europe so strong. It stands for unparalleled economic success and social peace. 'Prosperity for all' and 'advancement for everyone' are the common goals.

3. The European Union needs the emergence of a true European identity. This does not mean that the uniqueness of cities, communities, regions, or nations will be lost. On the contrary, a Bavarian will continue to be different from a Basque. Just as Portugal will continue to be something different from Sweden.

Heinrich August Winkler pointed out something important in 2007: "Europe is not built against the nations, but with them and through them. (...) A German sense of we and a European sense of we do not contradict each other. The third verse of the Deutschlandlied and the European anthem, Schiller's Ode to Joy, get along very well, black-red-gold and the blue European flag with the twelve golden stars as well."¹³⁹

European identity: that is, among other things, the heritage of the Christian-Jewish Occident and the Enlightenment, that is the experience of two world wars and the Holocaust, the memories of the 'Cold War' and the reunification of an entire continent, the commitment to peace, freedom, justice and democracy, and the awareness of being the institutional vanguard in the post-national age.

4. European institutions, including European civil society, must be strengthened. Above all, this means eliminating the EU's democratic deficit. To this end, the European Parliament in particular must become a 'normal' parliament with its own right of initiative and budget. The Lisbon Treaty

¹³⁸ bpb, <https://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/zahlen-und-fakten/europa/135825/handelsanteile> (Accessed 13 April, 2021).

¹³⁹ Winkler, Heinrich August (2007), 'Wie viel Nationalstaat verträgt Europa?', *Berliner Zeitung*, 23 March.

of 2007 was certainly a step forward. However, there are still too many rights to prevent and too few rights to shape the future of Europe.

5. Europe will only be heard in the world if it speaks with one voice. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger put it this way: He would not believe in a united Europe until he had the telephone number of the European foreign minister. That is now available. But a common European foreign and security policy worthy of the name does not yet exist.

We will get, indeed we must get, a common European army sooner than we think today. Anyone who sees that a country like the Federal Republic of Germany believes it can only afford a little more than 200,000 soldiers understands the problem. Anyone who promises to take on more political responsibility must also be fully capable of action.

6. The policy of simultaneous enlargement and deepening has failed. The time for enlargement is over for the foreseeable future. Countries where, as in Serbia, parts of politics still dream of Greater Serbia or where there is no religious freedom cannot become full members of the European Union. The same applies to Ukraine and Turkey.

7. United Europe is one of the two central pillars of the West. As such, it will only be able to meet the central challenges of the 21st century if Europe tackles them together with its partner, the United States. Despite all the differences on individual issues, the stability of transatlantic relations will determine whether democracy, human rights and freedom will prevail on a global scale or whether authoritarianism and terrorism will gain in influence.

Only together can Europe and America ensure that the Western model of the social market economy, the rule of law and liberal democracy is not replaced by the Chinese model of the market economy and authoritarianism. For at present, more and more states are gaining influence internationally that are not democratically constituted and reject liberal ideas of order.

For example, the Israeli political scientist Azar Gat has warned in the journal 'Foreign Affairs' that a successful but non-democratic 'Second World' could be seen by many people as an attractive alternative to liberal democracy if Western democracies run into economic difficulties.¹⁴⁰

Democracy and the rule of law must be the basis of the international rules of the game in the future. The idea that both are dispensable as long as the economic framework is right is not only cynical, but also wrong.

Three decades ago, the Western world won a great victory. It was

- the victory of freedom over egalitarianism,
- the victory of Western values over collectivism and materialism,

¹⁴⁰ Gat, Azar (2007), 'The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers', *Foreign Affairs*, July/August, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2007-07-01/return-authoritarian-great-powers>.

- the victory of the social market economy over the planned economy,
- the victory of liberal democracy over dictatorship.

The West won the 'Cold War' primarily because of its ideas and values and not solely because of money and weapons. This included the conviction and experience that liberal democracy and the social market economy are only conceivable together. Since the 1930s, the 'West' has been a "cipher for a concept of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, liberalism, tolerance, pluralism and a market economy."¹⁴¹

Another thing is important: Europeans and Americans must strengthen the transatlantic relationship by giving it a new shape. A strong Europe can not only better help confront common threats. It can also keep America from losing its internal balance. This balance is lost by anyone who does not have a partner at eye level and thus no counterpart, as has been witnessed during President Trump's term in office.¹⁴² With President Biden, there is now an opportunity to strive for a new world order based on shared universal values, human rights, and a free and social market economy.

A strong Europe capable of action is also a means of combating anti-Americanism and thus a gradual crumbling of the transatlantic alliance.

For a common policy, this means that the Europeans must concentrate on those areas in which they can meet the Americans on an equal footing.

This applies

- in shaping the global economic order
- environmental and climate protection,
- in the promotion of human rights,
- in the use of economic incentives and sanctions to call troublemakers in the international order to their senses,
- in development aid,
- in peacekeeping interventions, and
- in the police and intelligence fight against international terrorism.

Only together can Europeans and Americans also achieve that climate protection policy becomes a joint project after years of transatlantic confrontation. Here, above all, we need more cooperation. After all, climate change poses an existential threat to the world; preventing climate catastrophe is the central challenge facing humanity in the 21st century.

¹⁴¹ Ulrich, Stefan (2021), 'Wo Westen ist', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 1 April, p. 4.

¹⁴² Henry Kissinger (2014), op. cit. 16, p. 422ff.

As indispensable as Franco-German friendship is for progress in the European unification process: Only together can Europe be built on an equal footing with the USA.¹⁴³

Neither the U.S. nor Europe will be able to effectively assert their interests on their own in the world of the 21st century. Any attempt to do so would lead to a loss of significance for the entire West. Other states and alliances would fill the power vacuum.

A division of the West would only play into the hands of those who consider the canon of the Western value system to be an empty shell. The achievements, democracy, freedom, and prosperity, some of which were fought for in the past with bloodshed, would be endangered. America and Europe must not lose their compass: What is needed is a new liberal and democratic world order.

¹⁴³ Minkmar, Nils (2021), 'Revolution war gestern', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 12/13 June, p. 15; Wiegel, Michaela (2019), 'Kein Wunder, aber ein Anfang', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 11 December, p. 2; Gutschker, Thomas (2021), 'Heilige Verpflichtung', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 15 June, p. 3.